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Protecting The Steel Industry For
All The Wrong Reasons
Justin Berry
ABSTRACT. In the summer of 2002 President Bush made good on his campaign promise
to steel workers. He enacted tariffs of up to 30% on 10 types of steel imports, claiming
the U.S. steel industry was suffering from unfair trade practices by foreign firms. Were
the integrated steel firms really harmed by foreign competition, or were there other reasons
for the decline in the steel industry? Did President Bush have other motives when he
placed tariffs on steel imports?

I. Introduction
The issue is not whether the steel safeguards are catastrophic for
the U.S. economy; the conclusion is that the safeguards are
unambiguously a drag on the U.S. Economy [Hufbauer and
Goodrich, 2003b, 10].
In March of 2002 President George W. Bush made good on a campaign
promise to the steel industry when he enacted steel tariffs of up to 30%
on some types of steel. The justification given for the tariffs was to
protect the integrated steel firms from unfair foreign competition. It was
widely accepted by the American public that the steel industry was
struggling to compete with its foreign competition; however this is not the
case. The integrated steel firms have several other problems that are more
important than foreign imports. Once you take a closer look at the steel
industry you can see there was no economic justification for the steel
tariffs. When President Bush enacted steel tariffs, he didn't do so to
protect the steel industry from foreign imports. His motives were not near
as noble as that. He did so for his own political gain.

II. Background
Over the last 30 years, protecting the steel industry has been the rule
rather than the exception. Dan Ikenson put it best when he said, "It would
be difficult to find another U.S. industry already more coddled and
protected from the realities of the marketplace than the steel industry
[2002, 1]." In the early part of this decade we again decided to protect
61
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them. In 1999 and 2000 the steel industry was in the midst of a
downward turn in the economic cycle. The industry as a whole had a net
loss for 1999 and was well on its way to another loss in 2000. During the
campaign of 2000 both Vice President Gore and Governor Bush were
trying hard to get the important votes of the United Steel Workers of
America in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. During his campaign
for the presidency in 2000 President Bush promised steel workers that he
would not forget them once he got to the White House. In the summer of
2001 he set in motion a series of events that would result in the enactment
of section 201 tariffs on several types of steel imports. In June of 2001
President Bush, as well as the Senate Finance Committee, asked the
United States International Trade Commission to conduct a safeguard
study on 33 different types of steel imports. A safeguard study is a study
to investigate if foreign imports are harming the domestic industry such
that it needs trade protection. Five months later the ITC announced its
findings; imports had a serious impact on 16 of 33 types investigated.
Several types of steel were later merged into the same category, so in the
end this number was reduced from 16 to 12. In March of 2002 President
Bush ordered 10 of these 12 categories be protected with tariffs
[Hufbauer and Goodrich, 2003b, 2].

III. Cost of Protection
Hot-rolled sheet steel is one of the most important steel categories
protected. In 2002 the producer price index for this category increased
about 30%, or $80. Steel prices on the whole rose about 8.4% from the
first to the third quarter of 2002 [Hufbauer and Goodrich, 2003a, 7].
While protection is the not the only reason for the increase, it has
contributed. Antidumping and countervailing investigations also
contributed. The increase in manufacturing would also have an impact.
But who ends up paying for the increase? Steel is a major input for
several industries in the U.S. By protecting the steel industries others
downstream are forced to pay more for their steel. The increase in the
price of steel leads to an increase in the price of the final goods that have
steel as an input. The bill for protecting the steel industry is ultimately
paid by the final consumers of U.S. goods. In 1999 it was estimated that
an increase of $50 in the average price of steel would be a $6 billion tax
on Americans [Lindsay, Griswold, and Lukas, 1999, 7]. The exact impact

Berry: Protecting the Steel Industry

63

on consumers is hard to find but there have been some estimates. Robert
Crandall estimates the cost to consumers in a different way; he says for
each steel industry job saved, U.S consumers pay between $800,000 and
$1.1 million [2002, 1] Hufbauer and Goodrich estimate it would cost
more than $400,000 per job saved [2003a, 2].

IV. Downstream Effects
Final consumers pay for the protection of the steel industry with the
higher prices they pay for goods, but the industries downstream pay for
the protection in jobs. Crandall estimates for each job saved in the steel
industry as many as 13 could be lost downstream. If a 40% tariff is set on
imported steel it could cause downstream industries to decrease output
1.5 to 4%. The reduction in output would cost up to 85,800 jobs. On the
other hand the 40% tariff would only increase employment in the steel
industry by roughly 6,400. If a smaller tariff of only 20% is enacted, steel
using industries would lose up to 43,000 jobs while the steel industry
would gain about 3,200 [2002, 3]. Along with the loss of jobs comes the
explicit cost of additional unemployment payments to those who have lost
their jobs, and possibly some additional welfare costs. While all of the
numbers are just estimates, and all the steel imports are not subject to the
tariffs, the trend is perfectly clear; the steel tariffs are hurting the
industries downstream and raising prices for consumers.

V. The Proponents' Arguments
The steel industry and its supporters make several arguments to try to
justify the trade protection they receive. The comments of Representative
Phil English from Pennsylvania are an example of a common argument:
The domestic steel industry has been flooded by imported
products pouring in from Asia, Russia and Latin America,
swamping more efficient American producers and drowning
thousands of jobs. This tsunami threatens to wash away a
strategic industry that has been a keystone of our manufacturing
sector for generations [Lindsey, Griswold and Lukas, 1999, 2].
If we take a closer look at this we can see several errors in Mr.
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English's argument. The first claim made by Mr. English is that the
domestic steel industry is being flooded by imports. The World Trade
Organization's investigation of the U.S. steel tariffs found that the U.S.
government failed to show that imports were increasing for five of the
categories protected. Moreover, from 1999 to 2001 the amount of steel
imported generally declined rather than increased [Hufbauer and
Goodrich, 2003b, 3]. Also, import levels from1997 to 1999 were roughly
the same. The level of imports increased in the summer and fall of 1998
but fell again in the winter of 1998-1999. In February of 1999 imports
were less than those from April of 1998 [Lindsey, Griswold and Lukas,
1999, 5]. It should also be noted that the steel industry itself imports
large amounts of unfinished steel to work into finished steel products,
Lindsey, Griswold and Lukas found that U.S. steel mills accounted for
20% of total steel imports in 1998 [1999, 2].
Mr. English also claims steel imports are costing American steel
workers their jobs. However, protecting the steel industry will not
necessarily save jobs. Increases in productivity have caused the steel
industry to constantly downsize its work force over the last few decades.
In 1980 it required 10 man hours to make one ton of steel; in 1999 it
required less than four [Lindsey, Griswold and Lukas, 1999, 6]. From
1980 to 1998 the number of people employed in the steel industry
declined by 60%. Also, the number of workers has declined in 16 of 18
years during the same time period [Lindsey, Griswold and Lukas, 1999,
6]. Moreover, from 1984 to 1992, the last time the United States imposed
steel tariffs, employment in the industry fell by 78,300 jobs [Lindsey,
Griswold, and Lukas, 1999, 2].
Proponents of steel protection also argue that the tariffs will allow the
industry to consolidate and become more efficient. These proponents
never really explain how the protection speeds up consolidation; they
simply assert a relationship [Hufbauer and Goodrich, 2003b, 11]. These
same proponents point out consolidation did occur while the tariffs were
imposed. What the proponents fail to mention is every consolidation that
has occurred in the steel industry since 1997 has happened because of
bankruptcy [Hufbauer and Goodrich, 2003b, 11]. In this sense the tariffs
are actually hurting the steel industry by propping up weaker companies
and preventing the bankruptcy proceedings that lead to consolidation. By
artificially inflating the price of steel, consolidation in the seven
integrated firms is delayed. If the firms were to consolidate they could
experience some economies of scale and decrease their average per unit
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cost. The steel tariffs are actually having the reverse effect proponents
claim; they are slowing down consolidation in the industry. Even if the
integrated firms were using the protection to consolidate and increase
efficiency it is not justification for protection. Other American firms and
industries are able to consolidate and increase efficiency without the
benefit of protection. The integrated steel firms should be held to the
same standards.
The last argument made by proponents is that the steel tariffs will
stabilize prices. The argument is flat untrue. The prices for steel
products will still be able to fluctuate up or down on a daily basis just like
before. The only difference will be that the fluctuations will be at a
slightly higher price level. Or will they? Dr. Peter Morici, the former
chief economist of the United States International Trade Commission says
there is "no obvious correlation" between price changes and protection in
the steel industry [2002, 2]. Dr. Morici cites examples of products that
are protected, where the price rises only a small amount. He also cites
examples of products that were not protected, where the price rises
substantially. For example, Wide Flange Beams, a product not covered
under the section 201 tariffs, saw its price increase by almost as much as
many products that were covered [Morici, 2002, 3].
The steel industry has obviously been struggling in recent years. But
steel tariffs are not the answer. For eight straight quarters from 20002002 the steel industry had an after tax net loss every quarter. The
enactment of the section 201 steel tariffs helped the industry in the short
term as both prices and capacity utilization rose. But negative effects in
the industries downstream and in the steel industry in the long run far
outweigh the temporary gains. President Bush's advisors must have
known this from the beginning. All of the justifications were really just
a smoke screen. The steel tariffs are not addressing the real problems
facing the integrated steel firms. The tariffs only allow industry members
to deny what is really happening. The American public would not be so
willing to help the steel industry if they knew the truth; integrated steel
firms are suffering from their own actions.

VI. Steel Industry Problems
The steel industry is struggling, but imports are not the main problem.
The WTO found that the U.S. failed to show imports were the primary
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cause of injury to the steel industry. This was the correct finding; the
steel industry has three other problems that it needs to deal with instead
of worrying about competition from foreign companies.
The steel industry in the United States has too much capacity. Over
the last twenty-one years steel capacity has gone through three phases:
decline, constant, and increasing. From 1983 to 1987 American steel
capacity declined about 25% and essentially remained at this level until
1994. From 1994 to 2000 mini-mills were increasing capacity faster than
the larger integrated mills could get rid of it. Total capacity increased by
20%. The steel industry seems to have realized that in this case less is
more and has begun to reduce capacity again [Hufbauer and Goodrich,
2003a, 11]. However, the decline could only be temporary. Some of the
decline is due to the bankruptcy of LTV. When the bankruptcy
proceedings are complete, capacity may go back up. While the U.S.
International Trade Commission was conducting the safeguard study,
capacity utilization was at its lowest level since January of 1987
[Hufbauer and Goodrich, 2003a, 12].
Protecting the steel industry puts the integrated firms in a no win
situation. For the steel industry to be profitable prices have to be high,
but high prices make it more profitable to produce steel. When it is more
profitable to produce steel, the firms add additional capacity and increase
production. The increase in production lowers the price. The steel
industry provides a perfect real world example of this basic
microeconomic principal. In 2001, eight flat-rolled mills were idled,
because they were not profitable to operate, but once prices began to rise
in 2002 and 2003 four of them were opened back up. These four mills
increased total steel capacity by 10 million short tons, or roughly half of
what was lost when the eight were idled. Also, in 1995 and 1998 the steel
industry increased capacity after periods of rising steel prices [Hufbauer
and Goodrich, 2003a, 11].
The second major problem facing the steel industry is its high legacy
costs. Legacy costs are health care and pension obligations that
integrated steel companies owe to their retirees. The legacy costs of the
integrated firms are a two pronged evil in both costs and merger
prospects. Bill Klinefelter estimated that these costs could have a net
present value of more than $13 billion when he testified before the House
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection in 2002
[Hufbauer and Goodrich, 2003a, 12]. This $13 billion could continue to
grow. The rapid increase in pharmaceutical and other medical costs,
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coupled with the increasing life expectancy will not help the costs. The
high costs place a financial strain on the industry. In 1999, health care
costs for retirees were $15 per ton of steel; pension benefits added $50
more per ton. That same year the seven integrated firms lost $7 per ton
of steel [Hufbauer and Goodrich, 2003a, 12]. In 2001 and 2002 the
industry lost more money, and the legacy costs were even worse. Another
way to look at these costs is as the percentage of sales. General Electric's
legacy costs account for about 0.4% of their revenues. The steel
industry's legacy costs account for about 2.8% of their revenues. The
firm hit the hardest by legacy costs is Bethlehem Steel where they
represented 20% of the cost of sales [Senate testimony, 2002, 8]. The
legacy costs also make mergers less attractive since any company that
acquires the firm will also acquire its legacy costs. It should also be noted
that these legacy costs do not include any future environmental cleanup
costs that the integrated firms could be forced to pay.
The third major problem faced by the integrated steel firm is the
American minimill. There are several differences between minimills and
integrated firms. First, minimills use mostly scrap metal melted in
electric furnaces to make their steel products [Barnett and Crandall, 1986,
vii]. Minimills also are often more specialized in their product lines than
the integrated firms. Finally, minimills have fewer steps in their
production processes than integrated firms. This process reduction allows
them to be more efficient in their production [Barnett and Crandall, 1986,
4-11]. Competition from minimills is the main threat to integrated steel
firms, not imports! From 1964 to 2001 the amount of finished steel
imports increased 17 million short tons. While this might sound like a lot,
it is less than half of the increase in minimill production over the same
time period [Hufbauer and Goodrich, 2003a]. It should also be noted that
not all of the 17 million short tons imported were finished steel.
Remember that in 1998 integrated steel firms accounted for 20% of all
steel imports [Lindsey, Griswold and Lukas, 1999, 2]. These minimills
have a much better cost structure than their integrated competitors.
Figure 1 shows the profit margins from both types of firms for 1995-2002
[Source: SEC, 2002]. These higher profit margins allow the minimills to
make a profit in the down times when the integrated steel mills cannot.
This can be seen most recently as the minimills still had a positive profit
margin, while their integrated competitors did not.
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Figure 1
The real problem faced by the seven integrated steel firms is that they
have been overprotected throughout the years. It is possible that the steel
industry has been the most protected industry over the last 30 years.
Every time protection is supposed to allow the industry time to modernize
so it can compete with foreign firms. The steel industry is not using the
protection to create lasting competitive advantages; it is using it for short
term profit gains. If we continue to protect the industry there is no
incentive for them to ever modernize. The firms, unions and industry
organizations all know that the government will protect them again in the
future.

VII. Political Reasons
It is apparent that President Bush did not enact the Section 201 tariffs
with any economic justification. The WTO found the justification he tried
to use to be wrong. If there was no economic justification then why did
he impose the tariffs? President Bush enacted these tariffs for purely
political reasons. In 1994, Grossman and Helpman developed a model
that found the amount of trade protection for an industry to be a function
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of the political contributions from that industry. Grossman and
Helpman's model was originally designed to explain why governors treat
some industries differently then others but I believe this model can also
be used to explain the actions of a president. This model is a two stage
non-cooperative game where the lobbies make their contributions in the
first step and the government sets its trade policy in the second. The
incumbent government is only concerned with two things, the total level
of political contributions and aggregate well-being [Grossman and
Helpman, 1994, 838]. Grossman and Helpman characterize political
contributions "not so much as investments in the outcomes of elections,
but more as a means to influence government policy" [1994, 848].
Taking these contributions in mind, as well as other factors, the
government sets trade policy.
Even without considering Grossman and Helpman's model it is easy
to see the political advantages to protecting the steel industry. Ohio, West
Virginia and Pennsylvania were swing states in the 2000 presidential
election. President Bush won West Virginia and Pennsylvania by a small
majority, and lost Ohio by just as small a margin. If President Bush
wanted to count on winning these states in 2004 he needed to keep the
promises he made in 2000. Furthermore, the state most negatively
affected by the tariffs was Michigan, with its strong dependence on the
auto industry. President Bush was not going to win Michigan in 2000 and
most likely will not in 2004. Tariffs would increase support for Bush in
three states without significantly decreasing his support in other states.
Figure 2 shows the vote totals for Bush and Gore for the states mentioned
above.

Bush
Gore

Ohio
Pennsylvania West Virginia
2294167
2,264,309
329708
2117741
2,465,412
291088

Source: CNN.com/election/2000/results/

Figure 2
Another political benefit to President Bush is the passage of the Trade
Promotion Authority. In 1998, the House of Representatives voted 243
to 180 against "fast-track"(the Trade Promotion Authority is the same
thing with a different name). In 2001, the House passed the Trade
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Promotion Authority by one vote. 31 members of the house changed their
votes from no in 1998 to yes in 2001. Of these 31 votes, 10 came from
members of the House Steel Caucus [Hufbauer and Goodrich 2003a, 3].
While there is no direct evidence of a deal between President Bush and
the 10 who changed their votes, it appears too convenient to be purely a
coincidence. Ironic, isn’t it? Trade protection could lay the ground work
for future free trade agreements.
In reality, nobody stood to gain more from the steel tariffs than the
United States Government. The steel industry stood to gain little
compared to the federal government. With the increased revenues from
steel tariffs, the government expected to earn some $650 million more
from tariffs than the previous year. The numbers didn’t quite meet
expectations, but income from tariffs still rose $294 million over the
previous 12 months [Hufbauer and Goodrich, 2003b, 10]. The difference
is possibly a result of two things. First, exceptions limited the number of
products protected. Second, the policy makers underestimated the effect
the tariffs would have on imports [Hufbauer and Goodrich, 2003b, 10].

VIII. Possible Remedies
In reality, their are any number of ways to "fix" the steel industry, but
three seem to be the most reasonable. The government can step in and
help with the overcapacity problem. The most common way for the
government to do this is by buying capacity from the integrated firms.
The major problem with this alternative is the incentive it creates for steel
and other industries. How could the government be sure the firms
wouldn't add more capacity after selling their outdated plants to the
government? Also, if the industry has an overcapacity problem in the
future will this set a precedent? How will the government respond to
other industries that want the government to buy their excess capacity?
All of these issues would be opened if the government buys some of the
capacity from the steel industry.
The second idea is for the government to bailout some of the steel
industry’s legacy costs. On March 14, 2002 the Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions had a hearing with steelworkers
and leaders to discuss the legacy cost problem and what to do about it.
In this hearing the committee mentioned a need to find a way for the
government to solve the legacy cost problem [Senate testimony, 2002].
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The former first lady, Senator Hilary Clinton went so far as to say "... I
don't think there is any alternative, Madam Chairwoman, but to address
this legacy cost issue if we are serious about the industrial base of our
nation...” [Senate Testimony, 2002, 21]. This option could cause even
more problems than the first option. The steel industry is not the only
industry or firm with high legacy costs. Companies like John Deere,
Ford, GM, the entire mining industry and others all have high legacy
costs. If the government were to takeover or partially bailout the steel
industry's legacy costs each of the companies mentioned would be lining
up to have their legacy costs paid. Another variation of this option would
also be possible. The government frequently issues guaranteed loans to
companies. This is what enabled Lee Iacocca to rebuild the Chrysler
Corporation in the 1980's. The prospect of issuing guaranteed loans to
firms that have demonstrated an inability to earn profits even in a good
year is scary and risky.
The third option is a hybrid of the two previous ones. In this case the
government would take over some of the steel industry legacy costs in
exchange for the steel industry's reduction in capacity. This option, like
the other two, would lead to other firms and industries asking for the
same treatment. The government should not get involved in this mess at
all. However, if one of these three options has to be chosen, the third is
by far the best. With this option, an exchange occurs between the
integrated steel firms and the government. The other two just involve the
government bailing out the steel firms.
But in reality the best option is none of the three mentioned above.
The best option is to do nothing. What the President and the rest of the
government need to do is let the firms in the steel industry fight it out
amongst themselves. This Darwinist survival of the fittest approach will
allow the best firms to continue and succeed. The rest will either fail or
be sold to the successful firms. If the firms were allowed to do this, the
integrated firms would experience many benefits. The overcapacity issue
would be solved. The problem with the minimills would also be lessened,
since the remaining integrated firms would have a better cost structure.
It is time the government puts its foot down and makes the steel industry
survive in the world marketplace like every other industry in the United
States!
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IX. Conclusion
President Bush's decision to enact tariffs was flat wrong, and his
justifications were not economic. The section 201 steel tariffs are only
a temporary solution to a problem that is much bigger than foreign
competition. In reality, foreign competition is not a major problem to the
integrated firms. The steel industry needs to focus its energy on reducing
its high costs. Until the industry is left unprotected for long periods of
time, there will be no incentive to address the real issues. The industry
knows that it can always ask for protection again. It will be hard to lessen
the strain the legacy costs put on the industry. Bankruptcy may be the
only option to reduce the costs.
The President enacted steel tariffs to protect himself. No one had
more to gain from protecting the steel industry than the president and
other government officials. The projected increase in government
revenues would be the best thing to come out of the tariffs. It wasn’t help
to the integrated steel firms. Also, if President Bush were to not follow
through on his campaign promise to the steel workers in 2000, he could
lose support in 2004. Moreover, the president benefited from the lack of
any immediate consequences for his actions. It took over a year for the
World Trade Organization to rule against him. The passage of the Trade
Promotion Authority which grants him the authority to negotiate future
free trade agreements was also a major benefit. Some say economics is
the study of trade-offs. To protect the steel industry President Bush made
a trade-off; he put the welfare of the roughly 150,000 people employed
in the steel industry, and himself, ahead of the welfare of the other 290
million of us.
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